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 Conflicted scientists: the “shared pool” dilemma of
scientific advisory committees
Katherine A. McComas, Leah Simone Tuite and Linda Ann Sherman
Science advisors play a critical role in government policy making, yet these
advisors are often equally attractive to regulated industry. Despite efforts to
manage conflicts of interest among science advisors, allegations of conflict
frequently plague advisory committee deliberations or outcomes. This article
examines what we term the “shared pool” dilemma using data collected from
92 members of 11 US Food and Drug Administration advisory committees.
The results suggested science advisors were generally positive about their
experiences on advisory committees and viewed the committee process as
impartial. Written comments suggested that advisors linked the neutrality of
the process to the success of the FDA’s conflict-of-interest procedures. Even
so, the advisors acknowledged the challenges associated with recruiting
disinterested and qualified scientists to serve on advisory committees, reflect-
ing the shared pool dilemma. Many advisors seemed more troubled about
advisors participating when they lacked expertise than when they had minor
conflicts of interest.
1. Introduction
Scientific advisory committees are an integral part of regulatory decision making, providing
a low-cost supplement to government expertise and non-partisan review in an area ripe for
special interest lobbying (Hilgartner, 2001; Jasanoff, 1990). In 2003, over 200 US federal
expert advisory committees provided scientific and technical guidance for 18 federal
agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, National Science
Foundation, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of the Interior,
Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security, and operation costs
exceeded $287 million (US General Services Administration, 2003a). In an era of govern-
ment budget downsizing, scientific advisory committees will likely become even more vital
to government agencies unable to staff regular positions for such evaluations.1
Two requisite elements of scientific advisory committees are member expertise and
neutrality. In a poll of 975 advisory committees, which included both expert and non-expert
committees, government officials charged with committee oversight stated that their
committees’ most significant program outcomes were advancing scientific research and
building trust in government (US General Services Administration, 2003b). To accomplish
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these objectives, science policy advisors must be experts in their respective fields to ensure
the quality of their advice. The perceived credibility, legitimacy, and fairness of the advisory
committee process equally rest, however, on the perceived neutrality of committee member-
ship. In addition to achieving balance in membership, this neutrality entails committee
members being free from real or potential conflicts of interest. In other words, members
should not have financial, professional, or personal stakes in the outcome that could
influence them to act in a biased manner during committee deliberations or voting.
At first glance, satisfying this precondition may not appear so difficult; however, a
closer look reveals the crux of a dilemma—namely, that the qualities that make science
advisors attractive to government agencies also often make them equally appealing to
regulated industry (US Food and Drug Administration, 2002). Frequently, regulated industry
courts the very scientists most qualified to serve on advisory committees to work as
consultants or members of speakers’ bureaus. Alternatively, scientists having the greatest
experience with the products that come before committees for review, such as product
manufacturers or users, are disqualified from participating owing to a potential to benefit
from the failure or success of the product or policy decision. This explains, for instance, why
individuals who own blood banks do not generally participate on the US Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA) blood products advisory committee or why plastic surgeons are
sometimes controversial members of medical device panels (see, e.g., Rowland, 2003):
either situation poses a real or potential financial conflict of interest that requires screening.
A third scenario entails qualified scientists working for institutions (e.g., universities or
research centers) receiving industry funding or grants, which also raises a potential financial
conflict of interest. Although the federal government still provides the lion’s share of
research dollars to universities, industry-supported research has been steadily increasing in
academic settings in recent years (National Science Board, 2002). Any of the above
scenarios can give rise to real or potential conflicts of interest among scientists and result in
what we term the “shared pool” dilemma of scientific advisory committees.
This article examines the shared pool dilemma of scientific advisory committees. It
begins by analyzing more closely the assumptions underlying the dilemma, particularly
those related to expertise and conflict of interest. It then offers interview data collected from
FDA advisory committee members who answered a series of questions related to their
experiences with conflicts of interest and advisory committee procedures. Although not the
only science advisors who undergo conflict-of-interest review, FDA experts are arguably in
a unique position to comment on conflict-of-interest procedures. First, the FDA has relied on
advisory committees to assist with its regulatory decision making for several decades and
employs one of the federal government’s most extensive conflict-of-interest review proc-
esses for its advisory committee members. Despite the FDA’s efforts to reduce even the
appearance of conflicts of interest among advisory committee members (US FDA, 2002),
there are several recent examples when committee impartiality has been questioned
(Cauchon, 2000; Rowland, 2003; Willman, 1999). Constant reminders in headlines, as well
as lengthy conflict-of-interest review procedures to which each member must submit,
arguably increase the salience and relevance of conflict-of-interest issues to FDA advisory
committee experts. By incorporating science advisors’ views into an examination of the
shared pool dilemma, our intent is to understand more fully the challenges and constraints
associated with the science advisory process. Because the perception and management of the
shared pool dilemma influence who serves on science advisory committees, this article may
provide additional insight into how the credibility and legitimacy of the science advisory
process is actively constructed and maintained.
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2. Shared pool dilemma
The concept of a limited number of scientific or technical experts that are equally attractive
to government agencies and the industries these agencies regulate, i.e., the shared pool
dilemma, rests on at least two assumptions: (a) that a finite number of qualified experts
exists for any given topic, and (b) that the mere presence of a real or potential conflict of
interest may result in a member acting in a biased manner. There are arguments for and
against the validity of these assumptions, which we examine in turn.
Meaning of expertise
In simplest terms, the assumption of a finite number of experts necessitates a closed system,
where no new experts emerge or where current experts have somehow “cornered the
market” on the production or possession of new knowledge. In contrast, one could argue that
universities train new students and grant thousands of advanced degrees annually. One could
also point out that technological innovations frequently revolutionize scientific methods of
data collection and analysis, making former methods obsolete or simply out of date and
opening the door for new experts to emerge. In defense of these assumptions, however, the
claim may well be valid that at any given moment, a finite number of experts having the
requisite knowledge, experience, and training to participate effectively on an advisory
committee exists. Furthermore, with regard to expertise, one could argue that most scientists
only achieve “expert” status after long, established careers, which can include tenure at a
respected university, an impressive publication record, a successful track record of obtaining
extramural funding, and other public service or private consulting activities. Finally, it could
be unwise to discount the institutional memory or time-tested experience of scientists who
have been working in their respective disciplines for many years, which is arguably vital to
the development of expert pools.
Certainly, the meaning of expertise is itself a contested terrain. Much of the debate
surrounding expert qualifications appears in legal scholarship, which examines the use and
social construction of expertise in courtroom settings (Jasanoff, 1995; Risinger, 2000; Smith
and Wynne, 1989). Other discussions of expertise revolve around public involvement in
risk-based decision making (e.g., Krimsky and Plough, 1988; Renn et al., 1995; Sclove,
1995). Much of this literature examines expert/non-expert dichotomies or interactions (i.e.,
scientists talking with non-scientists or lay audiences), as well as the dominance of “expert
systems” over non-expert or local sources of knowledge in risk management and policy
making (e.g., Fischer, 2002; Wynne, 1992). Some of the most detailed research on the
science advisory process examined the techniques by which the National Academy of
Sciences actively worked to manage the perceived credibility and expertise of two of its
expert advisory committees whose neutrality and competency came under public scrutiny
(Hilgartner, 2001). This research also suggested that the meaning of expertise for science
policy advisors is frequently ambiguous and left largely to the discretion of committee
administrators to define.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act itself sets no standard for expertise, stating that
the appointment of science advisors and consultants remains at the “sole discretion” of the
appointing agency (Federal Advisory Committee Management, 2001). A brief review of
how a sample of federal agencies select their advisory committee members provides some
insight into how they exercise their discretion. To constitute its Science Advisory Board, for
example, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recruits individuals that are
“recognized, non-governmental experts in their respective fields” (EPA, 2004: 1). In
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addition to scientific experts, the EPA also includes members from industry and environ-
mental groups. The Performance Measurement Advisory Council of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) recruits members that are both “outstanding” and “objective.”
Balance and expertise are key, and the OMB gives weight to “viewpoint diversity, expertise
in performance measurement, and professional qualifications” (Daniels, 2002: 37,462). The
US Department of Defense (DOD) similarly emphasizes balance among member viewpoints
and requires that members have “demonstrated professional or personal qualifications
relevant to the committee’s work” (DOD, 2003: 3). Finally, the FDA obliges its voting
members to have:
expertise in the subject matter with which the committee is concerned and have diverse
professional education, training, and experience so that the committee will reflect a
balanced composition of sufficient scientific expertise to handle the problems that come
before it. . . . (Food and Drugs, 2003: 18)
In addition to scientific experts, FDA advisory committees include patient, consumer, and
industry representatives, although industry representatives are non-voting members.
This cursory review suggests that federal agencies seek balance, expertise, and training
when populating their advisory committees; however, there appears to be no set standard for
expertise. As a result, agencies arguably enjoy some latitude when recruiting their experts,
which could serve to ease rather than exacerbate the shared pool dilemma.
Explicating conflict of interest
Another assumption underlying the shared pool dilemma is that members having a conflict
of interest are prone to act in accordance with that conflict. Arguably, the reality is much
less certain since many factors will likely come into play. To examine this assumption
further, some background on the meaning of conflict of interest proves helpful.
Generally speaking, a conflict of interest entails having not only a “stake” or “vested
interest” in the outcome but also the power to influence it. A standard scenario involves a
situation where an individual or institution has decision-making authority and
(1) P [the individual or institution] is in a relationship with another requiring P to
exercise judgment in the other’s behalf and (2) P has a (special) interest tending to
interfere with the proper exercise of judgment in that relationship. (Davis, 2001: 8)
Key aspects of this definition requiring further elaboration are relationships, interests, and
the proper exercise of judgment. According to Davis (2001), relationships can be personal,
professional, or financial, but they must involve a connection between “P” and another party
that explains that party’s reliance on “P.” Interests refer to “any influence, loyalty, concern,
emotion, or other feature of a situation tending to make P’s judgment (in that situation) less
reliable than it would normally be” (2001: 9). Finally, what constitutes as the proper
exercise of judgment varies among accepted social, cultural or legal norms and is likely to
change if rules or norms are revised. For example, a scientist who accepts corporation funds
in return for speaking engagements would have a relationship with that corporation. If that
scientist were asked to serve on a government advisory committee charged with evaluating,
i.e., judging, that corporation’s product pending government approval, the scientist would be
in a state of conflict. In other words, the scientist’s financial or professional interest in that
corporation’s endeavors could influence him or her to exercise improper judgment or act in
a biased manner.
Davis (2001) offered three scenarios to illustrate objectionable aspects of conflict of
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interest. In the first case, individuals or parties having a conflict are either unaware of the
conflict or ignoring it. Although the latter of these two is less principled and arguably more
unethical, in neither case do the individuals or parties take adequate measures to reduce the
real or potential conflict. In case two, the conflicted individuals or parties intentionally
conceal the conflict, thus behaving immorally according to certain norms of conduct that
value disclosure. And in the third scenario, the conflicted individuals or parties acknowledge
the conflict but do not remove themselves from the decision-making position. This creates a
technical if not moral problem. As Davis argued, “Even as a technical problem, conflict of
interest can harm the reputation of the profession, occupation, avocation, or individual in
question” (2001: 12).
Conflict of interest and bias have different meanings although people frequently use the
terms interchangeably. Davis (2001) clarified that whereas bias suggests the existence of
prejudice, conflict of interest refers to the tendency toward prejudice. In this sense, having a
conflict of interest is similar to someone’s having inherited a gene that makes him or her
more susceptible to a condition, with no guarantee, however, that the condition will manifest
itself. Likewise, the mere presence of a conflict of interest does not mean that an individual
or party has acted or will act inappropriately or misuse their authority, but it does indicate
that the conditions exist for bias to occur. Or, to continue with an earlier science example,
although the scientist who accepts speakers’ fees from a particular corporation has a conflict
of interest when advising the federal government about the merit of that corporation’s
research, there is no guarantee that he or she will act inappropriately, e.g., to judge that
corporation’s work more favorably than extant research warrants.
Even so, the mere presence or specter of conflict of interest can be unsettling. Similar to
the presence of the repressed gene, the unpredictable nature of conflict of interest can
generate greater uncertainty in the decision-making process and ensuing outcomes, and this
unease has resulted in extensive efforts to identify, monitor, and manage real or potential
conflicts of interest before any malfeasance can occur. Accordingly, efforts to minimize
even the trace of conflict of interest among science advisors can reinforce or even increase
public confidence in the neutrality of the process. Consequently, even if government
agencies believe that science advisors would refrain from acting in their own interests, the
need to avoid the mere perception of conflict likely results in more conservative procedures,
which, in turn, could aggravate the shared pool dilemma. 
Conflict-of-interest legislation
Efforts to reduce real or potential conflicts of interest in the US federal government date
back several decades; conflict-of-interest legislation has been a part of the criminal code
since the 1940s. Specifically, Section 208 of Title 18, Acts Affecting a Personal Financial
Interest (1948), made it a criminal act for government employees to engage personally or
officially in any activity having a direct effect on the employee’s financial interest. Because
science advisors who participate on advisory committees are typically given “special
government employee” or SGE status, the criminal code placed a substantial hardship on
government agencies trying to recruit advisors. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 eased the
hardship by including a section related to SGEs. This new section made it legal for
individuals as SGEs to participate on advisory committees insofar as their expertise was
judged to outweigh the potential financial benefit they could accrue from participation
(Ethics Reform Act, 1989). In short, this law adjudicated that not all conflicts of interest
were created equally, particularly when weighed against the benefits of participation.
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In 1996, the Office of Government Ethics provided further guidance for managing
conflicts of interest. Under 18 USC 208(b)(1), federal agencies could issue waivers for SGEs
to participate provided that the disqualifying financial interest not be substantial enough to
affect the integrity of the SGE’s services to the government. Agencies would base
judgments according to the dollar value of the financial interest, its value in relation to the
individual’s overall assets, the extent to which the individual must exercise discretion, and
the need for the individual’s services in the matter. Exemptions under 18 USC 208(b)(2)
related to the relationship of the SGE to the product and the nature and value of the
disqualifying financial interest. Finally, 18 USC 208(b)(3) gave agencies permission to
authorize SGEs to participate in advisory committees convened under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, which included additional membership requirements. Under this section,
agencies would base decisions to grant waivers on the type of interest that disqualifies
participation, the identity of the individual whose interests are at issue, the uniqueness of
that individual, and the difficulty of finding an alternative individual of similar expertise
who does not have a potentially disqualifying conflict of interest. As with the other clauses,
the agency responsible for appointing the individual had to certify that the need for the
individual’s services, i.e., the individual’s expertise, outweighed the potential conflict of
interest.
More recently, the 1997 Food and Drug Modernization Act contained additional
requirements pertaining to FDA advisory committees reviewing clinical investigations or
marketing for drugs or biologics (Food and Drug Modernization Act, 1997). Specifically,
Section 120 stated that the FDA could not grant a waiver allowing a committee member to
review his or her own work.
This review suggests that early conflict-of-interest legislation arguably intensified the
shared pool dilemma by adding restrictions on the potential supply of science advisors.
Subsequent legislation aimed to decrease the burden on government agencies to locate and
recruit science advisors for their advisory committees, yet the importance of maintaining
credibility in the public’s eye has resulted in extensive procedures and management efforts.
Today, the conflict-of-interest procedures the FDA uses, for example, involve multiple
levels of review and as many as 11 steps, which include the preparation of financial
disclosure, responses to a questionnaire, preparation of waiver, review by the FDA’s ethics
staff, and final approval by the appointing official (US FDA, 2002). In addition to screening
for financial conflicts of interest, the FDA recognizes intellectual conflicts of interest,
although these are more difficult to define. In addition to minimizing the potential for bias,
these screening procedures arguably help to reassure the public, who cannot see “behind the
scenes,” that the bureaucracy is determinedly working to maximize committee expertise
while protecting the neutrality of committee membership (Hilgarter, 2001).
3. Hypotheses and research question
To examine the shared pool dilemma in greater depth, we launched a collaborative research
effort to examine the extent to which FDA science advisors viewed the conflict-of-interest
procedures as fair and impartial. As a corollary, we were interested in determining how
these perceptions influenced committee members’ satisfaction with the advisory committee
process. To frame our inquiry, we drew on the theory of procedural justice, which argues
that individuals care about the fairness or justice of procedures to which they are subjected
(Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Tyler and Folger, 1980; Tyler, 1994; Tyler et al., 1996).
Moreover, research has found that the degree to which individuals view procedures as just
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influences the degree to which they are satisfied with the process and the people in charge of
the procedures, sometimes even when the outcomes are not in their favor (Colquitt, 2001;
Lauber and Knuth, 1999; Phillips, 2002; Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Tyler and Folger,
1980). Finally, research has found that when individuals consider the procedures as just,
they are also more willing to accept the outcomes or decisions (Arvai, 2003; Tyler, 1994).
On the basis of procedural justice research, we therefore expected that when science
advisors perceived the conflict-of-interest procedures as more fair and impartial, they would
also be more satisfied with their participation. To allow for the possibility that science
advisors could evaluate fairness differently depending on whom one was being fair to, we
distinguished between “fairness to the advisor” and “fairness to the public.” In sum, we
proposed that:
c H1a: Perceived fairness of the conflict-of-interest procedures to the public will
positively influence members’ satisfaction with participation.
c H1b: Perceived fairness of the conflict-of-interest procedures to committee members
will positively influence members’ satisfaction with participation.
c H2: Perceived committee impartiality will positively influence members’ satisfaction
with participation.
In addition to examining the perceived fairness or impartiality of the conflict-of-interest
process, we were also interested in the extent to which committee members’ views about the
conflict-of-interest procedures influenced their satisfaction with advisory committee partici-
pation. To frame our study, we drew on group communication research suggesting that
satisfaction is influenced by the perceived quality of group members’ contributions (Gouran,
1973), as well as the extent of participation in the decision (Cooper and Wood, 1974). In
particular, Cooper and Wood (1974) found that group member satisfaction increased when
members participated throughout the decision-making process. Research has also shown that
the degree to which group members believe that their participation impacts decisions
influences their satisfaction (Folger et al., 1979). Folger et al. (1979) also documented a
“frustration effect” when individuals who saw their participation as limited were more
frustrated overall than individuals not given the opportunity to participate at all. From this
research, we posed the following hypotheses:
c H3: When members believe their participation had a greater impact on outcomes, they
will be more satisfied with their participation.
c H4: When members believe their participation was more useful, they will be more
satisfied with their participation.
We also posed a research question that focused more directly on the shared pool
dilemma—namely, how do science advisors perceive and understand the challenges
associated with managing real or potential conflicts of interest among advisory committee
members?
4. Methods
In cooperation with the FDA’s commissioner’s office, we collected survey data from FDA
advisory committee members at 11 meetings that took place in the Washington DC
metropolitan area between February and July 2003. These meetings were selected to
represent the four largest centers at the FDA: the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER), the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), the Center for Devices
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and Radiological Health (CDRH), and the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
(CFSAN). During the data collection period, some of the centers held more meetings than
others, so the sample includes a larger proportion of respondents from CDER and CDRH
advisory committees. In general, however, CDER and CDRH have more advisory panels
than the other centers have.
At each of the meetings, the advisory committee’s executive secretary permitted us to
distribute envelopes at each advisory committee member’s seat. Advisors included voting
members, as well as non-voting industry representatives. Each envelope contained a letter
describing the research and soliciting participation, the questionnaire, and a business reply
envelope. At each meeting, the study’s first author was permitted to make a statement at the
beginning of the meeting to introduce the study and request participation. In several cases,
we made direct contact with committee members to further encourage their participation.
Members were encouraged to complete questionnaires before leaving the meeting and drop
them in the box marked “FDA Survey” at the meeting registration table; however, they were
also told they could return the questionnaire at a later time in the business reply envelope.
To encourage openness, responses were anonymous.
The first seven questions used seven-point Likert-type scales followed by space for
open-ended comments. The questions were: (1) In general, how impartial do you think the
FDA advisory committee meeting process is? (2) How fair to committee members do you
think that the FDA’s procedures are for managing real or potential conflicts of interest of its
advisory committee members? (3) How fair to the public do you think that the FDA’s
procedures are for managing real or potential conflicts of interest of its advisory committee
members? and (4) To what extent do you believe that outside expertise and recommenda-
tions offered by advisory committees have an impact on FDA policy making? Questions 5 to
7 asked variations of the following — Overall, how would you characterize your participa-
tion in FDA advisory committee meetings: (5) not at all satisfying to very satisfying; (6) not
worth my time to very much worth my time; and (7) not useful to the FDA to very useful to
the FDA. Members were then asked the number of committees they have participated in as
a member, as well as whether they had ever been recused from committee service because of
a financial conflict of interest (1 = yes, 2 = no).
As noted above, we provided a space for additional comments under each question,
where we encouraged respondents to expand on their answers.
5. Results
Ninety-two out of 139 committee members participating in the 11 meetings returned
completed questionnaires. To estimate response rates, we counted the number of advisory
committee members present at each meeting. Table 1 lists the meetings we attended, as well
as the estimated response rates per meeting. Response rates ranged from a high of 100
percent to a low of 43 percent; the average response rate was 68 percent. In addition to
providing numerical data, 50 of these committee members (54 percent) offered a total of 127
written comments. To present the results, we first examine the numerical data and
hypotheses before turning to the members’ written comments.
Quantitative responses
Table 2 provides the means and standard deviations to the questions, as well as the
correlations among questions. On average, respondents reported participating in about eight
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advisory committee meetings; 20 percent reported participating in more than 10 meetings.
Most respondents had never been recused from serving on a committee because of a conflict
of interest; however, as the number of meetings they participated in increased, so did the
likelihood of their being recused at least once.
The numerical data suggested that advisory committee members were very positive
about their experiences as FDA experts. On scales with scores ranging from 1 to 7, with
higher scores corresponding to more positive assessments, the lowest mean was 5.4 in
response to the question about impact on FDA policy making; the second lowest was 5.8 in
response to the question about the committee’s usefulness to the FDA.
Table 1. Meetings and estimated response rates
Meeting Date(s) (2003) Members Responses Response rates
Oncologic Drugs (CDER) 12 to 13 March 16 11 69%
Blood Products (CBER) 13 to 14 March 12 11 92%
Dietary Supplements (CFSAN) 25 March 8 4 50%
Circulatory System Devices (CDRH) 10 April 12 7 58%
National Mammography Quality Assurance (CDRH) 28 April 13 8 62%
Antiviral Drugs (CDER) 13 to 14 May 17 9 53%
Dental Products (CDRH) 22 May 8 8 100%
Cardio-Rental Drugs (CDER) 29 to 30 May 14 8 57%
Nonprescription Drugs (CDER) 12 June 10 8 80%
Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs (CDER) 9 July 14 6 43%
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (CBER) 17 to 18 July 15 12 80%
Overall response rate for data collection 139 92 66%
Average response rate for 11 meetings 68%
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among variables
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Impartiality of meeting process 6.1 1.0 —
2. Fairness of conflict-of-interest
procedures to committee members
6.0 1.2 .38*
(90)
—
3. Fairness of conflict-of-interest
procedures to public
6.1 1.2 .63*
(89)
.63*
(90)
—
4. Advisory committees impact FDA
policy making
5.4 1.2 .20
(89)
.08
(89)
.03
(88)
—
5. Committee participation is
satisfying to member
6.1 1.0 .29*
(89)
.10
(89)
.15
(88)
.44*
(88)
—
6. Committee participation is worth
member’s time
6.1 1.0 .29*
(88)
.16
(88)
.13
(87)
.35*
(87)
.76*
(89)
—
7. Committee participation is useful
to FDA
5.8 1.0 .27*
(88)
–.04
(88)
.12
(87)
.42*
(87)
.55*
(88)
.61*
(88)
—
8. Number of meetings participated
in as member
7.8a 8.0 .00
(91)
–.27*
(91)
–.11
(90)
.23*
(90)
.31*
(90)
.23*
(89)
.29*
(89)
—
9. FDA has recused member from
service at least once due to
conflict of interest
1.9 .36 –.00
(91)
.19
(91)
.14
(90)
.00
(90)
–.12
(90)
–.06
(89)
.05
(89)
–.23*
(92)
Note: For variables 1 to 7, scale values range from 1 to 7 with higher means indicating more positive responses. For
variable 9, 1 = yes, 2 = no. Pairwise deletion of missing values; number of cases used in analysis shown in
parentheses.
a The mode was 1; the median was 6.
* p < 0.05.
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Several correlations were significant at p < 0.05. Namely, perceived impartiality of the
process was positively correlated with the perceived fairness of the conflict-of-interest
procedures to committee members and to the public (r = 0.38 and r = 0.63, respectively).
In addition, members who perceived the process as impartial also were more satisfied with
their participation (r = 0.29), considered it more worth their time (r = 0.29), and believed
their participation more useful to the FDA (r = 0.27). Believing the conflict-of-interest
procedures fair to the public was strongly correlated with believing the procedures fair to
committee members (r = 0.63). Members who believed their participation impacted FDA
policy making and was worth their time were also more satisfied with their experiences (r =
0.44 and r = 0.76, respectively). Members who believed their participation was useful to the
FDA were also more likely to believe their participation impacted FDA policy making (r =
0.42), were more satisfied (r = 0.55), and more likely to believe their participation was
worth their time (r = 0.61). Finally, members who had participated in more meetings were
more likely to believe their participation impacted FDA policy making (r = 0.23), be
satisfied with their participation (r = 0.31), and consider their efforts worthwhile and useful
to the FDA (r = 0.23 and r = 0.29, respectively); however, they were less likely to consider
the conflict-of-interest procedures as fair to committee members (r = –0.27).
To assess the importance of each independent variable on satisfaction, we performed a
standard regression analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). In addition to examining the
relative influence of perceived meeting neutrality, committee impact, procedural fairness to
public, procedural fairness to committee member, and meeting usefulness, we also included
the number of meetings a member had participated in and whether the member was ever
recused from service for control purposes. Owing to the high correlation between members’
satisfaction with participation and believing their participation worthwhile (both variables
also shared the same mean and standard deviation), we excluded the latter variable from the
equation. All variables were entered simultaneously with pairwise replacement of missing
values. The regression equation produced a multiple correlation coefficient of R = 0.66
(R2 = 0.43, adjusted R2 = 0.38), SEE = 0.75, F(7, 82) = 8.19, p < 0.001. The variables
having a significant impact on committee members’ satisfaction with their participation were
committee impact (ß = 0.24, p < 0.05) and meeting usefulness (ß = 0.39, p < 0.001).
Collinearity diagnostics showed no multicollinearity among variables. Table 3 presents the
results of the analysis.
To review, the first three hypotheses related to procedural justice and member
satisfaction with committee participation. Hypothesis 1a predicted that perceptions of
fairness of the conflict-of-interest procedures to the public would positively influence
satisfaction with participation, Hypothesis 1b predicted that perceptions of fairness of the
conflict-of-interest procedures to the committee member would positively influence satisfac-
tion with participation, and Hypothesis 2 predicted that perceived committee impartiality
would positively influence satisfaction with participation. The results did not show sig-
nificant correlations among perceptions of fairness to the member or public and member
satisfaction. Thus, hypotheses 1a and 1b were not supported. In comparison, committee
impartiality was significantly correlated with satisfaction; however, it did not remain
significant after controlling for the influence of other variables in the regression analysis,
suggesting only partial support for Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 predicted that perceiving a
greater impact from participation would positively influence satisfaction, and the results
from the correlations and regression analysis supported this hypothesis. Finally, Hypothesis
4 predicted that when members viewed their participation as more useful to the FDA, they
would also be more satisfied with their participation. Both the results from the correlation
and regression analysis supported this hypothesis.
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Qualitative responses
We concentrated on the written comments to answer the research question, which focused
on how committee members perceived and understood the challenges associated with
managing real or potential conflicts of interest among advisory committee members. In
doing so, we first looked for patterns in the responses (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Some of
these patterns related to the questions we asked, but other patterns emerged as well. Our
intent was to let the comments “tell a story” in relation to our research question, so we
looked for possible connections among responses to reveal underlying themes. Below, these
recurring themes are woven together under prose-like headings and supplemented by
illustrative quotes chosen to represent frequently expressed viewpoints in the members’ own
words.
The committee is impartial . . . the written comments suggested that members believe the
advisory committee process is as impartial as it can be given certain factors. As one
committee member stated, “It’s done very well in an atmosphere where potential for bias is
great.” Some of the challenges mentioned were legal and political influences on the advisory
committee process. One committee member cited an example when a panel’s recommenda-
tions were “overridden by staffers—when ‘pressure’ was applied.” Another committee
member offered this summary:
The regulatory process is obviously social and political, in addition to being intellectual
and scientific. The agency is very much aware of this, and works quite hard to balance
the process—getting buy-in (from the medical, research, and general community);
listening to industry while maintaining a proper distance (they’re perhaps less success-
ful on this score), and living with political pressures from inside the beltway.
. . . because the screening process works. A review of the comments suggests that
members attributed the perceived impartiality of the advisory committee process to their
perceptions that the conflict-of-interest screening process works. Many committee members
provided favorable comments on the conflict-of-interest screening process, describing it as
Table 3. Regression analysis for variables predicting satisfaction
with advisory committee participation (n = 82)
Variables B SE B Beta
Meeting neutrality .11 .11 .12
Conflict-of-interest procedural
fairness to members .13 .10 .16
Conflict-of-interest procedural
fairness to public –.04 .11 –.05
Committee impact on FDA policy .19 .08 .24*
Committee usefulness to FDA .38 .10 .39**
Number of meetings .02 .01 .14
Recusal from meetings –.31 .23 –.12
Constant 2.16 .79
Adjusted R2 = .38
SEE = .75
F (7) = 8.19**
Note: All variables entered simultaneously. Pairwise replacement
of missing values.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001.
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“exhaustive,” “fair,” and “well managed, thoughtful, [and] intelligent.” Some members
seemed to indicate that, at times, the screening process is more than what is called for, or
“scrupulous to a fault,” in the words of one committee member.
The members are well-qualified and objective. With regard to expertise, committee
members offered comments regarding the well-roundedness of committee makeup and the
objectivity of committee members. One member wrote, “There seems to be a good
distribution of experience and representation from a good distribution of stakeholders and
experts. I especially appreciate the representation position for industry.” Another member
mentioned the balanced representation of committee membership, including “clinicians,
clinical researchers, adult and pediatric representatives, statisticians, consumer [representa-
tives] and industry [representatives]. In addition, we bring in outside experts to add
additional expertise.” Another member commented,
I have been impressed by the expertise of invited consultants brought in to give input on
scientific issues. The fact that they can vote reinforces and strengthens their input and
position. I think we could use a full time community representative on the committee.
Otherwise, I’ve been very impressed with the process.
Committee members also pointed to the independence and objectivity of the panel. As one
member wrote, “The panel, being mainly academics, is composed of those used to
examining critically issues, processes, etc.—the main panel function. The screening process
is exhaustive enough to ‘weed out’ those biased individuals” (underlining in original).
Members also mentioned the willingness of committee members to listen to other
viewpoints. As one member commented, “The members of the committee mostly do their
homework, and are generally quite thoughtful in their comments, pretty open and honest in
their opinions and votes. They’re usually willing to listen, base their final decisions on the
evidence.”
The FDA benefits from this objectivity . . . according to their comments, committee
members believe that the FDA benefits from the perceived impartiality of its advisory
committee process. Members called their work “an important public service,” and a
“tremendous opportunity for gathering new information.” One committee member stated
that the “deliberation” and “free exchange” were very important. This member continued,
“Many of the subjects discussed are new concepts and need a lot of thought and discussion.”
Other comments clustered around the “real world” expertise that science advisors offer. One
member wrote, “Outside experts provide a practical ‘real world’ reality check on clinical
applicability of policies and add importantly to the fund of scientific expertise.” Another
concurred, “I believe the discussion is useful to FDA staff and that the committee brings a
‘real-world’ and diverse perspective not otherwise heard.”
. . .  as does the wider public. Members’ comments also suggested that members believed
their activities carried benefits beyond the FDA to the wider public. They used this to justify
the stringent conflict-of-interest procedures. For example, one member wrote that committee
work was “vitally important for the national health,” and therefore required “a standard of
rigor and impartiality that serves as an additional safe guard.” Another member pointed out
the benefit of giving a voice to individuals and groups impacted by the decisions:
These are important policy discussions and have far reaching impacts on the services
being provided. The importance of participation is to influence the decisions and
provide a voice . . . for the community for which these decisions have major impacts.
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But the screening process can be burdensome . . . several committee members’ comments
suggested that some members perceived the conflict-of-interest screening process as
burdensome or the public disclosure “uncomfortable.” As one member wrote, “I resent
having to divulge [dollar] amounts received for consulting/speaking.” Another member
expressed similar sentiments: “Private information must be disclosed to [the] public, but it’s
uncomfortable.” Another commented that the FDA “goes overboard to eliminate any
perception of conflict of interest—not only by vetting members in detail before the meeting,
but also by reading the results in the record” (underlining in original). Other members
commented that the extent of disclosure could dampen enthusiasm to serve on an advisory
committee. One committee member stated a concern that:
making financial disclosures public opens committee members to potential (inap-
propriate) attack within their own institutions by envious professional colleagues. This
is a political problem that may cause some potentially excellent candidates to avoid
service on the committee.
. . . and even appear arbitrary at times. Some committee members perceived the
conflict-of-interest procedures as arbitrary or unscientific, perhaps because the conflict-of-
interest procedures were merely guidelines, not absolutes. One member commented that the
“arbitrary nature of determination of who may not participate removes real experts from the
discussions,” while another member stated, “At times, [the] decision to exclude a member
has seemed unnecessary if full disclosure had been done.” With their comments, some
committee members suggested that the conflict-of-interest procedures, perhaps owing to
their somewhat arbitrary nature, have allowed some conflicted members to “slip through the
cracks” to participate in advisory committee meetings. As one member put it, “The panel, by
the design of the panel meeting process itself, can often get skewed in a certain
direction.”
A committee that is too impartial could ultimately hurt the public. Members’ comments
suggested that, in trying to close those cracks in the process, the FDA can sometimes be
overzealous in its attempt to reconcile the need for expertise in view of real or potential
conflicts. Or, and this may speak to the shared pool dilemma, unconflicted experts could not
be found, and so the FDA brought in people to participate who lacked the specific
knowledge and expertise about the subject at hand. Members’ comments suggested that they
viewed this scenario as problematic because the FDA risked basing a decision on advice and
recommendations from people who, although they may be otherwise well credentialed, were
unqualified to weigh in on that subject. As one committee member wrote:
I believe the emphasis on conflict of interest has resulted in a too impartial committee.
As a result the expertise is limited because of a lack of knowledge about the field. This
can result in decisions that adversely impact the operations of the field . . .
Another member expressed similar views, “The FDA prefers ignorance to perceived
conflicts. Several members know little about the issues because they are so far removed
. . .”. The consequences are far-reaching, according to another member’s comments:
I think the public loses when “experts” can’t give their expertise because of perceived
“conflicts,” which may not be (and usually aren’t) real. I have been at meetings where
the real expert/most knowledgeable person was not allowed to vote due to this. This is
then unfair to the public, ultimately (emphasis in original).
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6. Discussion
This article sought to describe the shared pool dilemma of scientific advisory committees
and then examine it from the perspective of science policy advisors who have participated in
one or more FDA advisory committee meetings. Overall, the numerical data suggested that
these science advisors were generally very positive about their experiences on advisory
committees and considered their participation meaningful, satisfying, worth their time, and
useful to the FDA. They also viewed the conflict-of-interest procedures as fair to the public
and to committee members, and they considered the meeting process impartial.
The theory of procedural justice provided a framework within which to examine more
closely science advisors’ attitudes toward the FDA’s conflict-of-interest procedures. Be-
cause procedural justice research suggests that individuals will be more satisfied with the
process when they view the procedures as just, we hypothesized that when members viewed
the conflict-of-interest procedures as fair to committee members and to the public, they
would be more satisfied with their participation. The results showed no significant
correlations among these variables. Perceived impartiality of the meeting process was
significantly correlated with satisfaction, but it was not a significant predictor of satisfaction
in the regression analysis.
Because of the strength of previous research demonstrating a relationship among these
variables (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Tyler et al., 1996), we are
reluctant to claim that no relationship exists but prefer to explore alternative explanations.
Among possible explanations for the lack of significant results are that the single items we
used to measure the variables were insufficient to capture the complexity of the concepts. In
addition, our sample could have been too small to capture accurately relationships among
variables. It is also possible that committee members viewed the conflict-of-interest
procedures as just one of many procedures related to advisory committee meetings, with the
likelihood being that there are many other procedures unrelated to conflicts of interest (e.g.,
agenda items, speaking turns, meeting logistics, and so forth). Furthermore, the question on
satisfaction asked whether members were satisfied with their participation on advisory
committees, not whether they were satisfied specifically with conflict-of-interest procedures,
although the written comments provided some feedback in this regard.
In considering the results, it is therefore important to review some limitations. From the
study’s inception, we viewed it as an exploratory first step. In designing our study, we
considered conducting personal interviews with committee members attending the meetings;
however, the extremely tight schedules of committee members at the meetings prohibited
conducting these interviews on site. To capitalize on the salience of the issue in members’
minds (which an interview scheduled at a later date could not count on) and potentially
obtain the broadest participation from a variety of committee members, we opted for a
survey at the meetings. Our initial intent was to request only written comments on the
questions; ultimately, we included scales with the questions to further reduce respondent
burden, i.e., respondents could choose only to provide numerical data and reduce their effort
considerably. To ensure adequate response rates from committee members, already viewed
as pressed for time, we deliberately limited our survey to nine questions. Certainly, the
reliance on scales to collect data poses limitations on the richness of data collected, which
we tried to offset by soliciting written comments. In addition, limiting the questions to only
nine items restricted our ability to construct more robust scales using multiple items. Future
research would do well to expand the questionnaire, using well-developed measurements,
and seek a larger sample.
The results supported Hypothesis 3, which predicted that when members viewed their
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efforts as impacting FDA policy making, they would be more satisfied with their participa-
tion. Similarly, Hypothesis 4, which predicted that when individuals viewed their efforts as
more useful to the FDA, they would be more satisfied with their participation, was also
supported. These findings reinforce previous research in group decision making, on which
these hypotheses were formulated, while underscoring the importance of outcome variables
in participant satisfaction (Chess and Purcell, 1999). Outcome variables, as opposed to
process variables, relate to whether participants’ input impacted decisions or made a
difference. In this case, members were most satisfied when they believed that the FDA
appreciated their efforts and that their efforts made a difference. Given that science advisors
obtain little financial compensation for serving on committees, it is quite understandable that
they would appreciate knowing that their time was “well spent.”
The qualitative data provided additional insight into members’ responses to the
questions, including their satisfaction with the procedures. More specifically, as reflected in
the numerical data, members’ comments suggested a strong belief that the committee
process was impartial. Their written comments appeared to link this impartiality to the
effectiveness of the conflict-of-interest process, which results in well-rounded, diverse
viewpoints on the committees and objective members. They believed that the FDA and, in
turn, the public benefit from this impartiality because it ostensibly increases the value of the
committees’ recommendations, the committees’ credibility, and the credibility of the FDA
and its decisions.
A recurring theme in members’ comments, which was not apparent from the numerical
data, was the burden of the conflict-of-interest procedures (e.g., lots of paperwork, loss of
privacy, and repetitiveness). The quantitative data did show, however, that the more
meetings members had participated in, the less likely they were to view the conflict-of-
interest procedures as fair to committee members. This is an example where the qualitative
data complemented the quantitative data. Two related themes in the written comments
pointed to potential flaws in the procedures’ effectiveness: (a) the process may sometimes be
arbitrary (exclusions or waivers were not warranted, sometimes decisions were judgment
calls, and the like) and (b) biased members sometimes slip through loopholes in the process.
Some members’ comments suggested that, perhaps worse than having conflicted members
participate in committee meetings was having members participate who were unqualified to
advise on the meeting’s subject. This likely happens because of the FDA’s quest to find
disinterested experts to serve as members, considered a difficult task, and/or perhaps from
the FDA’s zeal to mend loopholes in the process.
When interpreting the data, however, it is important to consider the potential of sample
bias. This was not a statistical sample, and the results should not be generalized to all
advisory committee members at the FDA or other federal agencies. In addition, it is possible
that committee members used their responses to this questionnaire to substantiate or justify
their commitment to the advisory committee process. Essentially, to rationalize their time
and effort given to the process, committee members could have been overly positive about
their experiences and the neutrality of the process, thereby offering a biased perspective. A
related possibility is that only members having strong opinions (positive or negative) about
their experiences on advisory committees responded to this questionnaire; the quantitative
results were indeed skewed toward favorable assessments of the advisory committee
process. Nevertheless, respondents were markedly candid in their qualitative assessments,
offering praise as well as criticism. As noted above, questionnaire responses were anony-
mous, so we presented comments without information identifying whether the respondent
was a research scientist, clinician, consumer or patient advocate, or industry representative.
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In retrospect, having this information may have provided additional insight into respon-
dents’ comments. Given the strong patterns or themes we found, however, that the results
were biased by one particular individual or perspective seems unlikely.
7. Conclusions
As government dependence on scientific advisory committees likely increases, presumably
so will the need for science advisors. Among factors potentially muddying the pool is the
increased availability of, and dependence on, industry funds for scientific research. Perhaps
more than ever before, many potential members for scientific advisory committees are
disqualified from participating due to their relationship—or their institution’s relationship—
with industry. This will result in increased challenges for government agencies seeking to
staff their committees.
This study examined one US agency’s quest to recruit science advisors for its advisory
committees who are free from real or potential conflicts of interest. According to a sample of
science advisors serving on FDA advisory committees, the FDA receives high marks for
perceived committee impartiality, fairness of conflict-of-interest procedures to the public,
and fairness of conflict-of-interest procedures to committee members themselves. Moreover,
the results indicate a deep, personal investment of many of these advisors into their role as
committee experts. In addition to feeling satisfied with their participation, these advisors
believed their efforts valuable to the FDA and to a wider stakeholder audience, and they
believed that their efforts were impacting FDA policy making. This connection to a higher
purpose or altruism could, in fact, play a role in lessening the influence of real or potential
conflicts of interest. Tyler (2003) recently found that when individuals’ ethical motivations
were activated, they were less motivated by self-interest and more by principles of fairness
and justice. Thus, to the extent that science advisors feel compelled to serve a greater public
good, they may be less motivated to act in a biased or self-interested manner. This would
serve to decrease the moral, if not technical, problem of conflict of interest (Davis, 2001).
Certainly, there are some cracks in the system, as there will most likely be in any
system seeking to regulate human behavior. According to the science advisors, sometimes
people have served on committees when they should not have, due to their having either a
conflict of interest or, alternatively, inadequate expertise or experience with the topic.
Resonating with the shared pool dilemma, it seemed that these challenges represent two
sides of the same coin, so to speak. That is, advisors either have (a) the requisite practical
experience and knowledge and are thus often conflicted because of some prior relationship
with industry, or (b) the theoretical knowledge and expertise yet no practical or professional
experience. Interestingly, it seemed that advisors were more disturbed by the latter type of
advisor serving on committees.
Another aspect of the shared pool dilemma is the laborious review process to which
members must submit before serving on committees. Many members lamented the burden of
the lengthy review process and the amount of information they were compelled to provide.
The degree to which the process decreases members’ willingness to serve could exacerbate
the shared pool dilemma. Finding ways to streamline this process may offer one solution for
federal agencies seeking to recruit science advisors, yet streamlining in itself brings to bear
substantial political and ethical implications, which could lessen the possibility of its
occurrence.
Two other solutions to the shared pool dilemma speak more directly to its assumptions.
The first entails expanding a more traditional conceptualization of expertise to include
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scientists and/or other individuals who may lack conventional credentials, e.g., personal or
professional experience with the product or long, established careers, but who nonetheless
can offer intelligent, critical, and perhaps fresh perspectives as science advisors. In some
sense, the FDA is already doing this when populating some of its advisory committees.
Some wariness accompanies this solution, however, as indicated by respondents’ comments
suggesting that an overly impartial committee may ultimately be a public disservice.
Working to balance membership by including scientists having traditional expertise yet
potentially also some conflicts as non-voting members may provide one compromise.
A second solution to the dilemma addresses the public’s willingness to accept some
conflict of interest among science advisors in exchange for access to what some may
consider the best expertise (e.g., the more traditional credentials noted above). Realistically,
as industry funding for scientific research increases, few alternatives may exist to relying on
some science advisors who have some financial ties to industry. In these cases, public
disclosure is key so that people can evaluate the scientist’s advice in light of the conflict.
Medical journals have adopted such an approach when publishing studies whose authors
have received industry funds for their work (International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors, 1993). For advisory committees, this approach would require a commitment from
the agency to ensure that real or potential conflicts among science advisors are publicly
disclosed and that the conflicts’ latent impacts on outcomes are somehow neutralized, such
as by limiting voting privileges. Some agencies, such as the FDA, already have adopted such
disclosure, and preliminary evidence has suggested that for members of the public who
attended FDA advisory committee meetings, tolerance for conflicts of interest among
science advisors was significantly correlated with knowledge of the conflict-of-interest
procedures and trust in the authorities in charge of those procedures, i.e., the FDA
(McComas et al., 2004). Thus, in addition to having conflict-of-interest procedures in place
to screen for conflicts and ensure that conflicts are publicly disclosed, members of the public
must know about these procedures and trust that those in charge will apply them fairly and
scrupulously.
In sum, this article offered a closer look into a dilemma that will continue to affect
government agencies seeking impartial expertise on science policy decisions. To the extent
that it has shed some light on potential challenges and barriers government agencies must
overcome, it has served a pragmatic purpose and achieved some applicability. Despite the
limited support for our hypotheses, we also believe that the procedural justice framework
holds considerable promise for examining conflict-of-interest procedures, and future re-
search should endeavor to explore this possibility further.
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Note
1 In addition to scientific or expert advisory committees, the federal government relies on policy-level and site- or
region-specific. Policy-level committees are typically comprised of stakeholder interest groups; whereas
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members of site- or region-specific committees typically come from local communities (Beierle and Long,
1999).
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